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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJ ta.h 
E. N. YOUNGREN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 8033 
ALICE H. KING, 
Defendant-and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 20th day of January, A. D. 1941, the appellant, 
Alice H. King, entered into an agreement designated a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Ex. A) with respondent, E. N. Youngren, 
whereby the former agreed to sell and the latter agreed to 
buy the real property therein described. 
By the terms of the contract (Tr. 21, 22, and Ex. A) re-
spondent agreed to pay appellant for the premises described 
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therein the sum of Two Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty 
($2850.00) Dollars as follows: Seven Hundred ($700.00) 
Dollars as down payment, Five Hundred ( $500.00) Dollars 
on January 20, 1942, · Five Hundred ( $500.00) Dollars on 
January 2o, 1943·, Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars on Janu-
ary 20, 1944, and Six I-Iundred and Fifty ( $650.00) Dollars 
or so much thereof of the principal and interest as remained 
unpaid oh January 20, 1945, together with interest at the 
rate of six per centum ( 6%) per· annum, payable annually. 
Appellant agre~d to deliver to respondent_ a good and suf~ 
ficient warranty deed conveying the premises described in the 
contract upon receipt of payment in full of the principal and 
interest. 
Respondent contends he has made payment· in full in 
accordance to the terms of the contract plus $128.50 ove~­
payment (Tr. 1, 21, 22), but that appellant has refused (Tr. 
26) to deliver to him a warranty deed to the premises described 
in the contract. 
Respondent avers he made the following payments to 
respondent (Tr. 21, 22, 26): 
January 20, 1941 --------------------------------$700.00 (Ex. B) 
January 14, 1952 --------------------------------$600.00 (Ex. C) 
March 13, 1943 -------:.-"'---------~~---~-------,.-$985 .00 (Ex. F) · 
March 16, 1~44· -----=--------------~--~---------$800.00 (Ex. D)· 
June 18, 1946 ------------------.:------------~----$200.00 (Ex. E) 
Total Pa y.ments --------------------------------$3 28 5. 00 
That of the total payments $~06. 50· (unnumbered exhibit). 
w~s for interest to and including the 18th day of June, 1946, 
making a total sun1 due to appellant of _$3156.50 resulting 
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1n an overpayment of $128.50, although in the complaint 
(Tr. 1) the overpayment alleged was $120.50. Except for the 
unnumbered exhibit which was never introduced in evidence, 
no effort was made in the course of the trial to determine how 
much respondent actually paid on the interest. 
Appellant disputes receiving a payment of $985.00 on 
lVIarch 13, 1943, (Tr. 34) but· claims she received a payment 
of $800.00 on March 16, 1943, (Tr. 35), and denies receiving 
any payment whatsoever in 1944 (Tr. 41), and admits (Tr. 
15) receiving the down payment of $700.00 (Tr. 34)", $600.00 
on January 14, 1942 (Tr. 34), and $200.00 on June 18, 1946 
(Tr. 34) for a total of $2300.00 which includes interest from 
the date of the contract (Ex. A) to January 20, 1952, leaving 
a balance due and owing on· the principal and interest of 
$1392.50 (Tr. 5, Ex. 1). 
Appellant concedes (Tr. 34) that she received a check 
(Ex. F) from respondent dated March 13, 1943, in the sum 
of $985.00, made by the _Utah Farm Credit Association payable 
to the order of the respondent and endorsed by him to the 
appellant who insists that she returned to respondent the sum 
of $135.00 for which she received no receipt and applied 
$50.00 on back taxes, leaving a total of $800.00 to be applied 
on the contract, and maintains (Tr. 35) that she gave to 
respondent a receipt (Ex. D) for $800.00 dated March 16, 
1944, for the $800.00 retained by her from the check (Ex. F), 
and expl_ains the discrepancy in the date of the check and 
the date of the receipt as an error when she mistakenly wrote 
the numeral 4 after the 194 ________ on the receipt instead of the 
nun1eral 3 (Tr. 36) and first discovered her error (Tr. 35) 
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when appellant was given a list of alleged payments by re-
spondent's counsel. 
On January 17, 1952, appellant served notice (Ex. 1) 
on respondent demanding payment of the balance due on the 
contract or for respondent to deliver to her possession of the 
premises described in the contract. 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found the issues 
in favor of the respondent, and findings (Tr. 84, 85), con-
. elusions (Tr. 85), and judgment (Tr. 86, 87) were prepared 
by respondent and signed by the trial court. From this judg-
ment and the refusal of the trial court to grant a new trial 
(Tr. 91 ), the appellant appealed (Tr. 92). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
RESPONDENT PAID THE APPELLANT IN FULL PUR-
SUANT WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
RESPONDENT PAID THE APPELLANT THE SUM OF 
. $800.00 ON _MARCH 16, 1944 ON THE CONTRACT. 
POINT III 
~THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
RESPONDENT PAID THE APPELLANT IN FULL PUR-
SUANT WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT. 
The law is well established in ·utah that the Supreme 
Court has full power to review all questions of law and fact 
in equity cases, and unless the evidence is clearly sufficient to 
sustain the findings of the trial court, the judgment rna y be 
set aside or modified. See McKay vs. Farr, 15 U. 261, 49 P. 
649, Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 U. 45, 57 P. 712, and Sidney 
Stevens Implement Co. vs. South Ogden Land, Building & 
Improvement Co., 20 U. 26, 58 P. 843. Only questions of 
fact are involved in th instant case and the argument is directed 
to the facts only. 
Respondent maintains he made a payment on the con-
tract (Ex. A) to the appellant by a check (Ex. F) dated March 
13, 1943, drawn by the Utah Farm Credit Association payable 
to respondent (Tr. 22). Appellant admits (Tr. 34) receiving 
a check in this amount, but says· (Tr. 34) she gave back to. 
respondent the sum of $135.00 and at respondent's request 
kept $50.00 for back taxes. 
Whether appellant gave to respondent $135.00 in change 
for the check (Ex. F) is of vital importance. Respondent 
claitns that he had paid the contract in fu.ll plus $128.50 
overpayn1ent. If he received back $135.00 from the check, 
by his ovv'n figures. (Tr. 1, 2·1, 22, 23, 24, and unnumbere.d 
exhibit), he would still owe $6.50 on the principal plus 
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interest, without at this time taking into consideration the 
disputed payment of $800.00 allegedly made in 1944 {Tr. 
22), and thereby the trial court improperly ruled that respond-
ent has paid appellant in full and was entitled to a warranty 
deed for the premises described in the contract . 
. There is no evidence to support the finding of the trial 
court .other than the unsupported testimony of the respondent 
v1hich is conclusively rebutted by the facts elicited at the trial. . 
Respondent evidently borrowed $985.00 as a loan on crops 
(Tr. 16) and was iSsued a check (Ex. F) by the lender for that 
amount. That he did not intend to· pay the appellant the full 
face value of the check is clear for he testified (Tr. 27) that 
he expec.ted to receive some money back from appellant, but 
at no time was it determined why he did no, except that he 
said ( T r. 2 7) c] was to have some of it back but I never got 
it back." 
Appellant, on the contrary, . emphatically said that re-
spondent told her (Tr. 34) CCI want to pay you $800.00 out of 
here . . . " Certainly respondent who expected to get some 
money back from the. check must have told appellant how 
n1uch he intended to give as payment on the contract. There 
can be no good and clear reason for disbelieving appellant 
on this testimony, but there is every reason to believe appel~ 
lant did give back $135.00. It must be remembered that the 
full purchase price was not due in March 1943 'for respondent 
was only in arrears on his payments the sum of $29.00 (Tr. 
23) and $800.00 was more than was due. Had appell.ant 
refused to give back the money, the respondent would hav~ 
asked for an explanation, and he certainly would have been 
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very angry, and would have remembered the transaction in 
great detail instead of treating the incident nonchalantly by 
merely saying (Tr. 27) HI was to have some of it back but 
I never got it back.'' 
Other testimony by respondent indicates conclusively that 
respondent did receive the sum of $13~5 .00 from the check. 
Appellant testified ( T r. 34) that respondent told. her to keep 
$50.00 out of the check for back taxes and respondent admits 
(Tr. 24) that he told her to do so. If this portion of the con-
versation is to be believed, why should the part of the con-
versation which concerned the $135.00 be disbelieved? 
We submit the whole conversation occurred as related 
by appellant. That. respondent had intended to make a pay-
ment in the sum of $800.00 and was to receive back $185.00, 
but when the question of taxes was raised, he decided to pay 
them, and demanded the return of $1.35.00, and that he did 
receive $13 5.00 for at that time there were no reasons for 
appellant to demand more than was due, and one can hardly 
conceive that when appellant got the check in her 4ands, she 
refused to give back the change demanded . without an expla-
nation, and he certainly would. have requested a receipt, but 
he neither asked for nor received a receipt for $985.00, and 
his reasons for not doing so is another factor which proves 
he did get the $135.00. 
Respondent was asked (Tr. 25): 
Q. And at this tin1e you gave her a check of so1neone 
else's for $985.00 and didn't take any receipt for 
the amount applied on the contract? 
.9 
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A. No. Because I told her the check-they hold it 
back. 
Q. But you were not going to get the check back? 
A. Yes, but I asked Mr. Winder's office if they v1~uld 
hold that check~ I asked for that check as a receipt. 
Q. When did you ask for it? 
A. When I made application for my loan. 
At the time respondent made application for the loan 
(Tr. 27) he did not intend to give all the money represented 
by the check to appellant for he testified (Tr. 25) .'I was to 
have some of it back ... " Since he intended to have some of 
it back, he could not have expected to keep the cancelled 
check as a receipt from appellant and did not tell the maker 
to· hold the check before he knew the appellant would not 
return any of the money. A representative of the maker of 
the check was a witness at the trial ( T r. 15) but was not 
asked by respondent to testify on this point. Respondent ad-
mits (Tr. 22) that he had difficulty finding the check (Ex. 
F). Why the difficulty? Had he really asked that the check 
be held woudln't the maker ·have made some notation on 
the check? Would not the maker have had some knowledge 
·of the request to hold· and thereby could have testified? 
Consider this. Respondent testified to an alleged con-
versation with appellant on March 16, 1944 (Tr. 22) ~ whereby 
he claims he tried to make a payment of $800.00 but appel-
lant said: 
''Why do you give me all. this money? Why don't 
you give me the interest and let the principal go?'·' 
10 
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True, the alleged conversation transpired a year. later, 
but it is informative. If the appellant in 1944 did not want 
to collect on the principal, it is inconceivable that in 1943 
against the will of the respondent she would keep a larger 
payment than was due. 
There can be no question appellant only received a pay-
ment of $800.00 in March, 1943. The trial court unquestion-
ably erred on this phase of the dispute, and had no basis to 
disbelieve the appellant, and thereby should not have found 
that respondent was entitled to a warranty deed for at least 
$6.50 plus interest was still due on the contract. 
POINT II 
. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
RESPONDENT PAID THE APPELLANT THE SUM OF 
$800.00 ON MARCH 16, 1944 ON THE CONTRACT. 
Appella.Qt denies (Tr. 37) and respondent claims (Tr. 
22) that in 1944 he made a payment' to appellant in the sum 
of $800.00 and received a receipt (Tr. 22, Ex. D) for the 
payment dated March 16, 1944. Appellant admits giving the 
receipt (Tr. 36) but avers that it was for the $800.00 she 
kept from the check (Ex. F) in 1943, and e~plains the differ-
ence in dates as a ·mistake in dating the receipt 1944 iD:stead 
of 1943 (Tr. 36). 
An exatnination of Exhibit F discloses that the numerals 
194 are printed and after the printed numerals a printed line 
l l 
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follows to allow space to add the numeral of the exact year 
thus 194 _________ It is not uncommon for a person without giving 
the matter a thought to write the same last numeral in the 
blank space which appears as the last pr~nted numeral. 
Aside from the natural mistake one can easily make when 
writing numerals, the facts concerning the alleged payment 
in 1944 are all in favor of the appellant. True the respondent 
has the receipt (Ex. F) and he testified to the payment (Tr. 
22), but _his own testimony is inconsistent and taxes the imagi~ 
nation. 
Respondent clait?s the payment of $800.00 was made on 
March 1.6, 1944, the· date appearing on the receipt (Tr. 22). 
He admitted by his reply (Tr. 8) to appellant's counterclaim 
(Tr. 5) that a payment was made on March 16, · 1943," but 
denied the amount. ·The arm of coincidence would have to 
stretch far indeed to believe respondent made two consecutive 
payments on the same day of the month, a year apart, when 
the particular month and day was not the regular time to 
make a payment. No, respondent was only taking advantage 
of an honest mistake made by the appellant in writing the 
receipt. 
According to appellant the payment was made with eight 
$100.00 bills (Tr. 22) which he said were received from the 
sale of hogs (Tr. 25) to an unknown hog buyer. Unfortunately, 
the exact day in March when the alleged sale was made was 
not elicited from the witness, but his convenient lack of memory 
concerning the identity of the hog buyer is suspicious. He did 
not even know how long he carried this large· sum of money 
before he paid the appellant (Tr .. 55) .. Obviously the respond-
12 
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ent tried to bolster his position when he tried to elicit from 
his sister (Tr. 78, 79) that in 1944 he gave her two $100.00 
bills he had received from the unknown hog buyer, but she 
testified the money could have been given to her either in 1943 
or 1944. 
We have only the respondent's word that he sold the 
hogs, but the evidence is overwhelming that if he did, no 
payment was made to appellant from the proceeds of the sale. 
Whenever appellant received a payment from respondent it?-
addition to giving him a receipt, she would make an entry 
immediately at the time she received the payment (Tr. 6l, Ex. 
2) in her personal account book. Appellant wrote, down a 
payment in the sum of $800.00 received from respondent as 
of March 16, 1944, the same as on the receipt, but when she 
learned of her error many years later (Tr. 59) ·appellant cor-
rected it by writing over the numer al 4 the numeral 3, in the 
last numeral 4 in 1944. Note that she did not erase or in any 
way try to conceal the change, but just wrote in the change. 
A person who wants to get money that he is not entitled to 
would not have made the change in this manne.r. 
~ignificantly, also, . an ex~mination of Exhibit 2 discloses 
that appellant had made entries of all payments, except the 
alleged payment of $985.00, which entries includ~d the pay-
tnent of June 18, 1946. Why would she have left out a pay-
tnent of $985.00? There can be only one reason-she did not 
ever receive a payment in this. amount. 
Appellant's position is further fortified by respondent's 
O\Vn testimony. He admits (Tr. 27) that when he borrowed the 
13 
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$985.00, he had no intention of paying all of it to appellant, 
and, therefore, when he applied for the loan he could not 
have asked, as he contends, the lender (Tr. 25) to hold the 
cancelled check for a receipt. A representative of the lender 
was in court ( T r. 15) , but he was not· asked to bolster the 
unsupported word of the respondent. Why? Because he had 
never made the request that the check be held. 
The appellant at various times (Tr. 39, 70) demanded 
payment from respondent, but he told her he did not have 
the money. She made an appointment with him for an ac-
counting (Tr. 36, 70) which he never kept, and although 
she attempted for one whole week (Tr. 3 7) to see him, she 
was never able to do so. Did respondent act like a man who 
had paid his debt in full or did he act like a man who was 
avoiding the creditor? The facts speak for themselves. 
Appellant at· one time even went so far as to give him 
a list of payments when requested by him (Tr. 42, Ex. L, which 
is missing), which her brother ·(Tr. 43) prepared. The exhibit 
is not before the writer, and from the transcript, it is impossible 
to determine how the accounting was set up. However, it is 
clear (Tr. 43) that an eror was made in the accounting show-
ing a payment which neither side claimed was ever actually 
made (Tr. 4.3), and the appellant, who is a housewife and 
not too well acquainted with business matters, was unable 
to explain the sums arrived at by her brother. However, lost 
Exhibit L did show a balance due and owing and the respondent . 
did not make an issue of it at the. time, but on the contrary, the 
accounting did not show a payment of $985.00 on March 
16, l943, or a payment in that sum on any other date. If 
14 
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respondent had ever made a payment in that su.m, would he 
not have pointed it out to the appellant at the time he re-
ceived the accounting? There is absolutely nothing in the 
transcript to even hint that he raised the question. There must 
be a good reason why he did not do so and this reason is that 
he never had made a payment of $985.00. When taking into 
consideration that the accounting was made in 1949, his failure 
to point out the omission of the alleged $985.00 payment is 
tnore than significant, it is conclusive that respondent had 
never made a· payment in that amount. 
We submit, the only clear and su~stantial evidence on this 
matter of payment in 1944 is all in favor of the appellant and 
the trial court had no reasonable basis for holding that a pay-
ment had been made. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 'REFUSING TO 
GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL. 
The appellant moved the trial· court for a new trial ( T r. 
89) upon the grounds of the insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the decision and judgment, and that the decision and 
judgment were against the law. The arguments in Points I 
and II are herein incorporated in Point III as good grounds 
and reasons why the trial court should have granted a new trial· 
\Vithout giving the arguments ·again in detail. · 
The motion for a new trial also included an allegation 
that the appellant had discovered new evidence which could 
·~ 
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not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and pro-
duced at the trial. The portion of the motion for a new trial 
was supported by an affidavit (Tr. 83). 
The affidavit (Tr. 83) set forth that the affiant was the 
sister of the appellant and that affiant's husband died on 
March 16, 1944, and that from the early hours of that day 
to a late hour of the night, appellant was not at her home but 
at the home of the affiant. The affidavit speaks for itself, and 
the trial court should have granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the points discussed herein, appellant sub-
mits, the judgment of the trial court should be set aside and 
c:t new trial ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
16 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Attorney for Appellant 
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